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1. Quantum gravity and philosophy
In recent times physicists and philosophers of physics have tended to tread very
different paths, and they have generally been a little suspicious of one another. As
Michael Redhead points out in the first of his Tarner Lectures, “many physicists
would dismiss the sort of question that philosophers of physics tackle as irrele-
vant to what they see themselves as doing” while “philosophers generally regard
physicists as naive people, who do physics in an uncritical way” (1996, pp. 1-2).
Reichenbach expressed much the same point even more strongly, suggesting that
there is a “mutual contempt in which each misunderstands the purposes of the
other’s endeavours” (1958, p. xi). This hasn’t always been the case, of course.
As Reichenbach goes on to say, “[t]he classical philosophers had a close connec-
tion with the science of their times” (loc. cit.). The division between physics and
philosophy is a fairly recent thing. In addition to this, historically, each time a
fundamental revolution has occurred in physics—e.g. Newtonian mechanics; the
relativity theories; quantum theory, etc...—there has generally been an associated
shift to a more critical, reflective attitude towards theory construction. Kuhn ap-
pears to suggest that such a shift is necessary for scientific change to occur at
all:
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It is no accident that the emergence of Newtonian physics in the
seventeenth century and of relativity and quantum mechanics in the
twentieth should have been both preceded and accompanied by funda-
mental philosophical analyses of the contemporary research tradition.
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 88)
Kuhn seems to hit the nail bang on the head as regards the present situation in
quantum gravity1 when he writes that:
Confronted with anomaly or with crisis, scientists take a different
attitude toward existing paradigms, and the nature of their research
changes accordingly. The proliferation of competing articulations,
the willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit discontent,
the recourse to philosophy and the debate over fundamentals, all these
are symptoms of a transition from normal to extraordinary research.
(Kuhn, 1970, pp. 90-91)
One finds exactly the proliferation and recourse to philosophy that Kuhn speaks
of in the context of quantum gravity. It thus functions as an ideal case study to
test the claims of Kuhn—and, indeed, a host of other ideas from the philosophy
of science (cf. Callender & Huggett, 2001a, p. 2).2 But having said all of this,
though physicists have been known to take up more philosophical attitudes in
times of crisis, ‘the philosophers’ have previously remained firmly divided from
the constructive practice of theory building in physics; waiting in the wings, as it
were, until the theories were deemed sufficiently well established to warrant their
attentions. This is true of quantum gravity too; but it needn’t be the case.
1For the purposes of this paper it will suffice to understand quantum gravity as some quantum
theory that has general relativity as a classical limit. Heuristically, it helps to view this as a ‘syn-
thesis’ of quantum field theory and general relativity—Cao (2001), for example, views quantum
gravity in just this way; Rovelli too appears to view loop quantum gravity in this way (e.g. 2004,
pp.4-7).
2Unfortunately, however, what I take to be the ‘best bit’ of Feyerabend’s (1975) message of
“anything goes” hasn’t quite been heeded by the researchers of the different programmes—recall
that the idea was that the availability of multiple approaches can spark off new research direc-
tions in them. However, this requires that the researchers occupying the various camps actually
take notice of the other camp’s methods, aims, and results. It would undoubtedly prove useful
if there were more ‘cross-fertilization’ across the methods, but the workers tend to restrict them-
selves to their own pet approach to the exclusion of all else, leading to a fairly insular landscape.
Fortunately, there are signs that this is beginning to change.
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One of the main aims of this essay review is to highlight the extent to which
many of the problems of quantum gravity are predominantly ‘philosophical’ in
their nature and origin.3 The strange case of quantum gravity provides a place
where philosophers might play a role in constructive parts of the foundations of
physics - though, as I have already mentioned, this probably will not include in-
volvement in the technical foundations. Cao, believing consistency and concep-
tual clarity to be of the essence in quantum gravity (since there is no experimental
basis), makes a similar point:
... this is a rare conjuncture for philosophers to intervene, with
a good chance to make some positive contributions, rather than just
analysing philosophically what physicists have already established.
(Cao, 2001, p. 183)
I agree. There are at least three reasons behind this possibility as I see it:
• These days philosophers of physics are simply better equipped in terms of
their command of the necessary parts of mathematics and physics required—
many of them did their original training and research in physics, and one
often finds them publishing in physics journals.
• Quantum gravity is an area of physics lacking an experimental basis from
which to test the various proposals, thus forcing conceptual and mathemat-
ical consistency to take center stage.
• Most importantly, it appears that the kinds of conceptual problem that litter
the field of quantum gravity are ones that philosophers are already well
familiar with, as I have already suggested, and aim to show in more detail.
But philosophers, however, have generally been rather slow to pick up the
challenge of quantum gravity, seemingly being more content with flogging poor
3This should not, however, be taken to imply that the solutions to these problems are going to
be philosophical too. It is far more likely that a large amount of technical gerrymandering will go
towards resolving the difficulties faced: quantum gravity is hard. It is unlikely that philosophers
will actually be involved in these areas of quantum gravity. However, they might, and should,
play a crucial role in clarifying exactly what the problems are, where they come from, and how
they might be tackled. The foundations of quantum gravity are a mess, and philosophers tend to
be particularly adept at tidying such messes up. I do not mean this disparagingly; nor do I mean
to align philosophers of physics with Lockean ‘under-labourers’: the work involved is hard and
important.
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old non-relativistic quantum mechanics to death! This is made all the more sur-
prising given that many researchers engaged in quantum gravity actively encour-
age the involvement of philosophers in their discipline. For example, Carlo Rovelli—
author of one of the textbooks that is the subject of this review—explicitly voices
this opinion:
As a physicist involved in this effort [i.e., quantum gravity], I wish
the philosophers who are interested in the scientific description of the
world would not confine themselves to commenting and polishing
the present fragmentary physical theories, but would take the risk of
trying to look ahead. (Rovelli, 1997, p. 182)
Rovelli is a physicist who has contributed to numerous philosophical collections—
the passage above is from such a collection—in a bid to bolster philosophers’ en-
thusiasm for his approach to quantum gravity—the approach known variously as
loop quantum gravity, loop gravity, or the loop representation (it is arguably the
only strong competitor to string theory, and my personal view is that it is in fact far
superior).4 John Baez—a mathematical physicist who has done important work
in making loop gravity rigorous, and again is keen to debate with philosophical
audiences—also makes a similar point to Rovelli (again writing in a philosophical
collection):
Can philosophers really contribute to the project of reconciling
general relativity and quantum field theory? Or is this a technical
business best left to the experts? [.] General relativity and quantum
field theory are based on some profound insights about the nature of
reality. These insights are crystallized in the form of mathematics,
but there is a limit to how much progress we can make by just playing
around with this mathematics. We need to go back to the insights
behind general relativity and quantum field theory, learn to hold them
together in our minds, and dare to imagine a world more strange, more
beautiful, but ultimately more reasonable than our current theories of
it. For this daunting task, philosophical reflection is bound to be of
help. (Baez, 2001, p. 177)
4The other founders of this approach (e.g. Abhay Ashtekar, Lee Smolin, and others) also
demonstrate a heightened sense of philosophical awareness. Like Rovelli, Lee Smolin shows an
openness to philosophical issues, and likewise contributes to philosophers’ events and books.
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Thus, the doors are wide open for philosophers to enter. But few philosophers
have chosen to do so.5 Up until very recently the same might have been said of
special relativistic quantum field theory, though lately, and largely through the
work of the Pittsburgh philosophy of physics group, there has been a definite shift
of emphasis from non-relativistic quantum mechanics to relativistic quantum field
theory—a very welcome move in my opinion (Cushing, 1988, notwithstanding).
As welcome as this shift is, though,methodologically the philosophy of relativistic
quantum field theory is much the same as non-relativistic quantummechanics (and
likewise subject to Rovelli’s gripe): the mathematical and theoretical framework
exists (admittedly, modulo certain nasty consistency problems in the interacting
theory) and the experimental data is there to confirm this framework. The job of
the philosopher of physics is to examine this framework and explicate its relation
to the the world (or some set of possible worlds according to which the theory is
made true). The uniqueness of quantum gravity as a ‘challenge’ to philosophers
arises precisely from the lack of such an established framework and associated
medley of confirming experiments, and philosophers would do well to shift their
gaze in its direction because of this feature. Moreover, though there are novel
interpretive problems in relativistic quantum field theory that aren’t in standard
quantum mechanics, the novelties involved in bringing together quantum field
theory and general relativity promise to be far greater, more profound, and more
spectacular. Rovelli, in particular, (in the book I review here) does a fine job in
bringing these interpretive issues to the surface in a way that develops in one an
awe for them and the conceptual foundations of quantum gravity in general.
After this brief motivational section, let us now turn to the two books in ques-
tion. I begin with a general description and assessment, after which I survey, in the
subsequent section, a number of interpretational issues that they raise. I propose
to focus on Rovelli’s book far more than Kiefer’s, since the former’s book will, no
doubt, appeal to a philosophical audience more so than the latter’s. Interpretive
issues are never far from the surface in Rovelli’s—though that is not to say that
5We can perhaps diagnose the apprehension in two ways. Maybe the ‘toll’ on entrance is too
high. The mathematics required is very hard, and given that philosophers have enough to worry
about, this might over stretch them. Or maybe the incompleteness bothers philosophers. Quantum
gravity is not all wrapped up. There is not a single door leading to it; rather, there are several
doors, leading to very different places (string theory, loop gravity, causal sets, etc...). I think that
Rovelli’s book shows that philosophers need not be bothered by the technical demands; it can be
made very palatable indeed. Rovelli also demonstrates that his preferred approach (loop gravity)
looks like it has every chance of success—even if it should ultimately fail, it nonetheless provides
many insights into gravity, symmetry, and space and time.
5
they are entirely absent from Kiefer’s.
2. Outline and assessment
Beyond their matching titles, and the fact that each is intended to function as a
textbook, there is in fact very little overlap between these books. They set out
to accomplish very different goals. I think that only Rovelli’s succeeds qua text-
book, but the title Quantum Gravity is something of a misnomer in the case of
Rovelli’s book since he restricts his attention to his loop quantum gravity—it is
not a misnomer for Rovelli; for him the loop gravity approach is in charge of
the field since it makes testable (i.e. falsifiable) predictions and provides a gen-
uine merging of quantum field theory and general relativity (see 2004, p. xiv).
Kiefer, by contrast, gives a very general overview of several well trodden meth-
ods6—though canonical quantum gravity (labeled “quantum GR” by Kiefer, and
of which loop quantum gravity is a ‘subspecies’) gets by far the most exposure on
the grounds that “it is closer to established theories and because it exhibits many
general aspects clearer” (2003, p. 21). Both authors are, then, on the side of the
loop approach.
The fact that the canonical approaches are closer to established theories (quan-
tum theory and general relativity) certainly makes this class of theory easier to
interpret, for we can in many cases carry what we know of the other theories
into this different context—though we will be applying them in very new contexts
(e.g. applying the uncertainty relations to the geometry of space). The relatively
‘conservative’ nature of loop quantum gravity (being a canonical approach) will,
I think, increase the chances of its (or a close relation of it) being ultimately suc-
cessful in terms of which theory is chosen to function as our theory of quantum
gravity. Of course, in the final analysis, it depends on whether it makes the right
predictions!
As regards possible competition, both books are ‘loners’. There is, as Kiefer
rightly points out, no comparable book on quantum gravity that has the same
scope as his does, at least no single-authored monograph. There is a collection
6Kiefer’s book struck me as being very much like Chris Isham’s magisterial reviews of quan-
tum gravity (see Isham, 1997, for a typically fine example). Although the technical details are
presented, it is done without much by way of demonstration: generality is the key aim—but see
below. (Kiefer too, like Isham, is intent on unpacking the conceptual foundations of the various
approaches.) Thus, I seriously doubt that one could learn quantum gravity from this book. How-
ever, this is not to say that the book is ‘easy going’ mathematically speaking. Most philosophers
of physics will have problems getting through the complexities, but rewards can be found amongst
the complexities.
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(Giulini et al. (eds.), 2003) that is rather more general than Kiefer’s, and is also
intended to serve as a pedagogical guide.7 In fact, one of the problems I had with
Kiefer’s book was that, although it was general, it wasn’t quite general enough. If
the brief is to cover quantum gravity in all of its forms, then lip service must be
paid to the more ‘maverick-like’ approaches: TQFTs, causal sets, twistors, non-
commutative geometry, and the like. It is through these approaches, for example,
that we begin to see connections emerging between the ‘front-runners’: string
theory and loop gravity. However, I would not be without Kiefer’s discussion of
“Covariant Approaches to Quantum Gravity” (2003, pp. 23-60). It is easily the
best exposition I have seen of the concepts, methods, and problems of covariant
approaches.8
Rovelli’s book stands alone in being a completely self-contained guide to the
mathematical and conceptual foundations of loop gravity. One really could learn
the theory from scratch from this one book! Not only that, one can get a clear
picture of the kinds of philosophical implications of the theory. It is, for this
reason, the most important book on quantum gravity to have appeared thus far
(at least, as far as philosophy of physics goes).9 I should, in fairness, point out
that there is another textbook on the loop approach by Gambini and Pullin (1996),
though they take a slightly different approach to Rovelli and Smolin’s—moreover,
philosophical issues are rather harder to extract from their book.
As far as background goes, both books require a prior acquaintance with quan-
tum field theory and general relativity. However, Rovelli presents this material
from scratch, and the approach to general relativity that he uses is based on the
vierbein formalism (wherein the gravitational field is a tetrad field, rather than a
metric field), thus highlighting the connection to gauge theory. Kiefer’s book calls
upon far more resources from mathematical physics, and no real attempt is made
to render the book self-contained. Nor, given his aims, could he have made the
book self-contained without it becoming staggeringly large. However, one possi-
bly serious omission (vis-a´-vis their status as textbooks) from both Rovelli’s and
7Note that Kiefer is on the editorial team of this book, and also contributes an article.
8Although Michael Duff’s early article “Covariant Quantization” (1978) comes in at close
second.
9Rovelli (2004, p. xiv) points out that Thomas Thiemann has a book close to completion on
the mathematical foundations of loop gravity (Thiemann, 2001). He suggests that his ‘book can
almost be read as as Volume 1 (“Introduction and Conceptual Framework”) and Thiemann’s book
as Volume 2 (“Complete mathematical framework”) of a general presentation of loop quantum
gravity’. This is a fair and true comment; but for philosophers I should think Volume 1 of this pair
is sufficient.
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Kiefer’s books is exercises. If one wishes to learn something really well, then one
needs to know how to apply it. However, in the case of Rovelli I think that the
results are worked out so well, and with enough detail that this gripe loses force.
There are some fairly fine-grained derivations of results in Kiefer’s book too. Let
us now turn to a more detailed examination of these two books.
2.1 Analytical synopsis of Kiefer’s book
Kiefer begins by motivating the search for quantum gravity, and outlining the
main directions of research. As motivations he cites ‘unification’, ‘black holes’,
‘the problem of time’ (2003, pp. 2-4). (Rovelli, by contrast, does not see such
motivational arguments as necessary and simply ‘launches in’). In a nutshell: (1)
unifying theories has been fruitful in the past, so we should expect it to be fruit-
ful in the future; (2) we need an account of the final stages of black holes since
classical general relativity is not up to the job; and (3) the frameworks of quantum
field theory and general relativity involve radically distinct conceptions of space
and time, and this inconsistency needs to be ironed out. If these motivations are
not sufficient he cites a dimensional argument showing the quantum gravitational
effects should become non-negligible at the Planck scale (ibid., pp. 4-7). In this
case we need a theory to deal with such a regime, and we don’t currently have one.
His discussion of the various approaches to quantum gravity is far too brief, and
it is marred, as is the rest of the book, by the absence of any mention of methods
falling outside of the remit of canonical and covariant quantization (I am including
string theory in this latter category)—Kiefer employs Isham’s distinction between
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ approaches, according to which either heuristic quan-
tization rules are applied to general relativity or else general relativity is derived
from a more fundamental quantum theory (as in the case of string theory). I would
have liked to see a much more detailed taxonomy of approaches in a book of this
kind, perhaps along with a discussion of alternative ways of carving up the plen-
itude of approaches (i.e. an analysis of the different taxonomies). Chapter 1 also
contains a fairly useful discussion of the problems encountered in semi-classical
approaches to quantum gravity. I shan’t dwell on it, but since there has been some
discussion of this topic in the philosophical literature (Mattingly, 1999; Callender
& Huggett, 2001b; Wuthrich, 2004), I will simply point out that Kiefer is of the
opinion that coupling a classical system (such as a classical gravitational field) to
a quantum system (such as quantized field acting as a source of stress-energy for
the gravitational field) results in a ‘transference’ of quantum properties.
Chapter 2 is the best bit of the book as far as I am concerned. It is a very
detailed examination of covariant approaches to quantum gravity, beginning with
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the concept of the graviton and ending with supergravity. The original covari-
ant approaches were perturbative: one decomposes the full spacetime metric gab
into a fixed or background part and a ‘perturbation’ pab about this non-dynamical
background. In order to utilize the machinery of quantum field theory, the back-
ground part is identified with flat Minkowski spacetime with metrical signature
ηab = diag(−,+,+,+). Thus we get:
gab = ηab + pab (1)
where the perturbation is small (i.e. the force of the gravitational field is assumed
to be very weak). Kiefer demonstrates how the notion of the graviton, with its
characteristic helicity and mass properties, flows from the covariant quantization
of this theory. The crucial point is that the flat Minkowski background allows
for the construction of gravitons from the representation theory of the Poincare´
group.10 Without this we do not get an invariant notion of ‘particle’ (see, e.g.,
Wald, 1994). But, as Kiefer points out, this setup is only applicable at low ener-
gies; beyond the linearized level the analysis breaks down, and the graviton is lost.
However, useful for understanding string theory’s claim to quantum gravity is the
discussion of Weinberg’s analysis of covariant quantum gravity. Weinberg (1995),
in his discussion of covariant quantum gravity, showed that, in the vacuum case,
one can derive the equivalence principle and general relativity from the Lorentz-
invariance of the spin-2 quantum field theory of the graviton: the spin-2 theory is
equivalent to general relativity and follows from the quantum theory. The upshot
of this is that any theory with gravitons is a theory that can accommodate general
relativity (in some appropriate limit). This analysis forms the basis of string the-
ory’s claim that it is a candidate theory of quantum gravity: since there is a string
vibration mode corresponding to a massless spin-2 particle, there is an account of
general relativity (see Kiefer, 2003, p. 34, for more).
The presupposed flat background of covariant quantization methods is a con-
ceptual problem, for sure, but it leads to even worse technical difficulties in the
context of general relativity. I am referring, of course, to the non-renormalizability
of the theory—this was the death-blow to these approaches, not the conceptual
troubles.11 However, there is a missed opportunity by Kiefer here to expound
on the way in which the conceptual problem of the fixed background spacetime
10From this point of view, then, there is nothing ‘special,’ conceptually or technically, about the
graviton; it is just another particle, like the photon. Both the photon and the graviton are derived
in similar ways, and perform similar functions in the theory. This is one of the reasons behind the
general relativists’ distaste for such methods.
11Indeed, I think it is safe to assume that had the technical troubles of non-renormalizability
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and the technical problem of non-renormalizability interact, for there is a sense in
which the technical problem has its roots in the deeper conceptual problem. This
is frequently brought out by those physicists who favour background independent
or discrete models of spacetime (e.g. Ashtekar (ed.), 1988, pp. 3-6; Rovelli,
2004, pp. 8-9 and p. 12). Kiefer concludes from this discussion that though the
perturbative approach can lead to physical predictions, within the framework of
an effective field theory—and, indeed, it is surely required to extract ‘real’ physics
from whatever quantum theory of gravity we eventually end up endorsing—what
is really needed is either a non-perturbative approach or else some unified the-
ory that eclipses standard field theory.12 The remainder of Kiefer’s book is then
devoted to such approaches.
Kiefer follows his discussion of covariant methods with a very lucid chapter on
“Parametrized and Relational Systems,” which he describes as “important concep-
tual preparation for the canonical quantization of GR” (ibid., p. 61).13 This is a fair
characterization, for many of the problems with quantum general relativity stem
from the fact that we include time amongst the dynamical variables. This is bound
up with the fact that, like general relativity, such systems are constrained systems
when written in Hamiltonian form—much of this chapter is devoted to explicat-
ing the machinery of constrained systems. Kiefer begins by considering the much
discussed toy example of the parametrized non-relativistic particle. (He also con-
siders the relativistic particle and the bosonic—i.e. non-supersymmetric—string).
Kiefer notes that this example involves the “disguised” use of absolute time
as a dynamical variable.14 This paves the way for a response to Kretschmann’s
not been evident, the approach would have lived on for much longer despite the use of the fixed,
background spacetime. The reason for this is that the tools of standard quantum field theory had
been remarkably successful in quantizing other forces, and there were huge expectations that the
same would go for gravity: do unto gravity as one does unto the other forces!
12Thus, we need not desert a theory just because it is non-renormalizable. The theory of the
renormalization group (see Binney et al. 1992), and the programme of effective field theories show
us how we might view general relativity as an effective field theory that is nonetheless capable of
making physical predictions (cf. Donoghue 1994, 1996). See Burgess (2004) for a very readable
account of this viewpoint. Castellani (2002) offers a nice elementary survey of effective field
theories and their philosophical implications.
13I should point out that Kiefer falsely attributes Anderson’s pioneering work on symmetry
groups and absolute objects to Ehlers in the opening spiel of this chapter.
14Note that its “recovery” is also possible though the process of deparametrization. No such
procedure is available in the context of general relativity, there is no distinguished time, and so
general relativity is not a deparametrized theory (cf. Kiefer, ibid., p. 102). Clearly, to prove this,
we need to test whether or not the identification between the phase space Γ of general relativity
and the phase space Υ of a parameterized field theory goes through. This proposal requires that
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objection to the physical content of general relativity’s principle of general co-
variance. Kretschmann’s problem, you will recall, was that every system can be
converted into a generally covariant theory, so that principle can hardly be said to
be a physically significant feature of general relativity. But Kiefer notes that the
‘conversion process’ comes “at the price of disguising absolute structures which
formally appear then as dynamical variables” (ibid., p. 64). This is not the case in
general relativity, its general covariance is “natural in the sense that the metric is
fully dynamical” (ibid.). But here, as in many places, a good place for a discussion
of some foundational issue of philosophical interest is nipped in the bud almost as
soon as it begins; given this, the claim that this is “conceptual preparation” looks
rather thin on content. The chapter finishes with a discussion of Barbour and
Bertotti’s Machian theory of mechanics. In contrast to the time-reparametrization
models, these relational dynamical systems contain no disguised time, and attempt
to achieve a purely relational notion of time, relying, as Kiefer says, “exclusively
on observational elements” (ibid., p. 83). This kind of theory corresponds more
closely, then, to general relativity. But, one would like to see more discussion of
both these models and their relationship to general relativity. It is all too brief
(though the issues are raised momentarily again in the subsequent chapter: on
pages 102-3).
Next come three chapters leading to the formulation of loop quantum gravity.
Firstly, let me say that I think that there are better expositions of this material15;
however, there are many original touches that set it apart from these, and make it
a worthy addition to the literature. Also, in the space he has he does a very good
job of integrating exposition and asides on the meaning of the formalism. Kiefer
begins with the Hamiltonian formulation of general relativity, and introduces the
metric, connection, and loop representations of the classical theory—two further
chapters then deal with their quantization. There are some very clear, novel, and
interesting discussions of the constraints that arise in the Hamiltonian formulation
of general relativity (these are the canonical implementation of the 4-d diffeo-
morphism invariance), including a little on the problems of time and observables
(ibid., pp. 103-5). In a nutshell these problems go, respectively, as follows:
• The Hamiltonian constraint of the theory is a first class constraint and should
there is a canonical transformation Φ : Υ → Γ such that Φ(Υ) = Γ. However, there can be
no such transformation because Υ is a manifold while Γ is not (cf. Torre 1994). Hence, general
relativity is not a parameterized field theory!
15My personal favourites are the papers in Ashtekar (1988); Ashtekar (1991); Ehlers and
Friedrich (ed.) (1994); and Rovelli’s book reviewed in this article. Baez and Munian (1994)
functions as a nice primer on this material.
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therefore be viewed as a gauge transformation. However, since the con-
straint is responsible for generating the time evolution of the data from one
hypersurface to the next it looks as if time evolution corresponds to the un-
folding of a gauge transformation. Gauge transformations are, of course,
unphysical.
• The definition of ‘observable’ in the context of constrained systems is given
as a variable that (weakly) commutes with all the first class constraints.
However, since one of these is the generator of time evolution (the Hamil-
tonian constraint), the observables must be constants of the motion.
As regards the first problem, Kiefer points out that the gauge view can be
adopted as long as one realizes that the constraint simply expresses the equiva-
lence of the various evolutions along different foliations. His second response
draws on ‘view from the outside’ versus ‘view from the inside’ division. There is
no conflict with experience, says Kiefer, for our experience of change is a matter
our “tracking [on the ‘inside’] one part of the variables with respect to the remain-
ing part” (ibid., p. 104). Kiefer’s responses, I think, merit further attention from
philosophers.16 However, again, the discussion here is marred by its brevity.
The next chapter’s highlights are a ‘six step’ route to the quantization of
Hamiltonian general relativity (in the geometrodynamical formulation) and a dis-
cussion of the problem of time in the quantum context. In the latter case, what we
get is basically an updated review of the options as laid out in the classic reviews
of the problem of time by Isham (1993) and Kucharˇ (1992). The following chap-
ter considers the quantization of the constraints as they appear in the connection
and loop representations. The key results are given, and the quantization of the
geometrical operators is sketched. However, I imagine the discussion here will
be too terse to follow unless one already has a grip on the concepts (the whole
chapter is just 13 pages long!).
In the next two chapters Kiefer deals with the important issues of black hole
quantization and quantum cosmology.17 It is, more or less, incumbent upon the
approaches to quantum gravity to say something about these matters, and Kiefer
does a good job motivating them. Their is a wealth of detail in these chapters. The
chapter on black holes would make a fine review article for readers wishing to
16His treatment of first problem, for example, looks a little like Maudlin’s response in his battle
with Earman (2002). Maudlin, however, rejects the gauge interpretation.
17In fact, I think these chapters would have benefited from coming after the string theory chapter
so that that theories approach to these problems could be integrated within the discussion.
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get quickly up to speed with the various recent issues. Philosophically speaking,
the central issue is that concerning the ‘information-loss paradox,’ according to
which pure states can evolve into mixed states as a result of Hawking radiation
(black hole evaporation). The problem here is to explain what has happened to the
information (Earman et al., 1999, give an excellent overview of the interpretive
options).
There then follows a rather brief treatment of string theory, with some men-
tion of recent themes, including duality, branes, and its particular way of dealing
with black hole entropy (as I mentioned above, this latter theme would have been
better integrated with the discussion of the loop representations treatment of the
entropy). Though this chapter is indeed brief, Kiefer does a very good job pre-
senting it in about the most concise way I have seen. However, what are highly
interesting conceptual problems are simply dashed off in minor paragraphs. For
example, the notion of a minimal length is mentioned, and compared to the min-
imum length that appears from the quantization of the geometrical operators in
loop gravity (ibid., p. 247). I would have liked to see this developed some more.
How are the notions related? Also, it is pointed out that the D-branes can “probe”
resolutions smaller than the minimal length. What sense are we to make of this?
Philosophers would do well to get stuck into this area, and unpack exactly what is
involved in such claims.
Kiefer concludes with what looks to be a general interpretive chapter; how-
ever, there are really only two issues: decoherence theory and the arrow of time.
Here Kiefer is concerned with the question of how and why—if the superposi-
tion is universally valid and applies to the metric field—we observe a classical
universe. Kiefer bases the classical appearance of the universe on decoherence.
Decoherence is a process that suppresses superpositions of macroscopically dis-
tinct states; it generally becomes important for large objects—i.e. systems with
many degrees of freedom. The idea is that systems are coupled to their environ-
ments; the more degrees of freedom they have (roughly, the more macroscopic
they are) the more strongly they are coupled, and the quicker decoherence acts.
This analysis demands, then, that we specify a ‘system’ and an ‘environment’.
In the context of quantum cosmology an environment doesn’t make much sense;
quantum cosmology is about the universe as a whole, and considers variables
that are associated to this object. Kiefer apparently endorses a proposal of Zeh’s
according to which the universe ‘self-measures’ itself—e.g. by variables (such
as the radius of the universe, or ‘scale factor’) interacting with other degrees of
freedom—and thus supplies its own environment (ibid., p. 266).
Finally, Kiefer suggests that the problem regarding the ‘arrow of time’ (why
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there are certain processes for which we do not observe a time-reversed version)
might receive its ultimate resolution in the framework of quantum gravity (ibid., p.
274). The root idea is that the expansion of the universe functions as the ‘master
arrow’ for the many other ‘arrowed’ phenomena. All of these arrows seem to
point back to some “special initial conditions,” conditions near the big bang. Of
course, this is outside of classical gravity’s realm, and is where quantum gravity is
expected to deliver answers. Thus, Kiefer looks to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation
for the origin of irreversibility. I have to say, I found the argument here too quick.
But the claim is so philosophically profound that it must warrant some attention
from philosophers with interests in asymmetries of (or in) time.
2.2 Analytical synopsis of Rovelli’s book
Let us turn now to Rovelli’s book. We find that it is in three parts dealing re-
spectively with the foundations of general relativity, loop quantum gravity (includ-
ing spin-foam models), and various odds and ends in the form of appendices—
there is also a useful chapter-by-chapter bibliography. There are three appendices
in all: one on “Groups and recoupling theory”; one on the history of quantum
gravity18; and one comprising some philosophical remarks about the enterprise of
quantum gravity (basically, on theory change, methodology, realism, and truth—
he offers a defense of realism). The latter is an engaging ‘plea’ for more philo-
sophical reflection on the part of physicists and for more dialogue between physi-
cists and philosophers. It is rare, and heart-warming even, to see a physicist dis-
cussing such mattes at all, let alone in a serious physics textbook! This attests to
the fact that this is as much a book for philosophers as it is for physicists.
The first chapter is an excellent, ‘not too technical,’ highly-condensed sum-
mary of the entire book, and would function as a ideal primer for philosophers
wishing to get quickly acquainted with the central objectives and concepts of the
loop gravity approach without getting their hands ‘dirty’ with the formal underpin-
nings of the various claims (taking the claims ‘on trust,’ as it were). The focus here
is on bolstering physical intuition19, and all of the conceptually weighty moves are
18This is nicely done, and shows how loop quantum gravity fits into the bigger picture. However,
for a more detailed history see Rovelli (2000).
19A good example of this is Rovelli’s presentation of loop gravity as a natural synthesis of two
historic episodes: the Faraday like idea “that forces are described by lines” and the Einsteinian
idea of background independence (2004, p. 17). Each move resolves serious problems faced by
the other: background independence clears the problem of ‘overcompleteness’ traditionally faced
by going to the loop basis, and the loop basis clears the problem of controlling diffeomorphism
invariance.
14
laid out clearly for all to see. Basically, this is essential reading for philosophers
of physics wishing to engage with loop gravity and, I suggest, for philosophers of
spacetime.
The centerpiece of the book is really the generalized framework Rovelli out-
lines for constructing theories. Rovelli is on a mission to free physics ‘from the
prejudices associated with the habit of thinking of the world as “inhabiting space”
and “evolving in time”’ (p. 10). In other words, the book forges a path away
from background dependent physics to background independent physics (physics
without a fixed, nondynamical metric). His strategy involves a reformulation of
mechanics based on a distinction between, what he calls, ‘partial’ and ‘complete’
observables. I discuss this below, but for now it will suffice to say that the idea is
based on a somewhat unorthodox treatment of constrained systems, according to
which no variables are privileged as ‘time’ and ‘space’. One makes a choice, and
then forms a complete observable from a pair of partial observables by forming
a correlation between the two. The theory is then about the evolution of these
‘relative quantities’, rather than the evolution in time of independent quantities.
One thing that puzzled me in this opening chapter—and has puzzled me while
reading many articles on loop gravity—was the suggestion of an equivalence be-
tween non-perturbative approaches and background independent approaches to
quantum gravity. Recall the perturbative expansion that characterized the old co-
variant perturbation approaches: gab = ηab + pab. Rovelli generalizes this to
e(x) = ebackground(x)+h(x), so that the background part needn’t be Minkowski—
note that Rovelli uses a dreibein (a triad matrix, or field) e(x), as opposed to a
metric, to represent the gravitational field. The idea is that the background is
fixed, and this suffices to determine coherent notions of, e.g., spacelike separa-
tion, and so on, so that one can construct a quantum field theory of h(x). Thus,
one ‘pulls’ the gravitational field off spacetime, and deals with it as a perturbation.
Now, Rovelli claims that any approach to quantum gravity that does not make this
split is a background independent approach. Thus, he equates background inde-
pendence and non-perturbative methods (in this restricted context). I would like
to see an analysis of the connections between these two notions, for prima facie
they seem distinct: one can surely have a non-perturbative approach that is not
background independent? The recent moves in string theory seem to comprise
just such a counterexample. So maybe the implication only works in one direc-
tion: background independence is sufficient for assuming that a non-perturbative
approach has been taken, but not vice versa. Likewise, if a pertubative method is
in operation, then one can assume that it is a background dependent approach too,
but not vice versa. Further work needs to be done here, and it will most probably
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suit philosophers of physics rather than physicists.
Chapter 2 deals with classical general relativity. The presentation is slightly
unorthodox in that Rovelli uses the tetrad field to represent the gravitational field,
rather than the metric field. The reason for this has to do with the potential ad-
dition of matter (fermions) and with its role in quantum gravity. Unorthodoxy
arises again, given that this is a physics textbook, in that most of the chapter is
concerned not with the presentation of formalities, but with detailed discussion of
the physical interpretation and conceptual foundations of general relativity. Thus
we find an historico-conceptual reconstruction of the theory; a discussion of gen-
eral covariance and the hole argument; and a discussion of the difficult problem
of what the observables of the theory are. In a section entitled “Complements”
there is further, more explicitly philosophical discussion of Mach’s principles, the
debate between substantivalism and relationalism, the Kretschmann objection, an
analysis of the various meanings of time, and more. The material in this section
will, I expect, prove to be a treasure trove for philosophers. For example, Rovelli
carves out a lineage from Cartesian relationalism leading to a form of relational-
ism about space in loop quantum gravity. He uses the hole argument to argue for
a relationalist position, according to which points of spacetime have no intrinsic
ontological significance—where by “intrinsic” is meant independently of further
specifications that serve to pick out a certain point. The upshot of this is that there
is no notion of localization on the manifold; localization concerns relations be-
tween dynamical objects. This feature, known as background independence, lies
at the conceptual heart of loop quantum gravity.
Lee Smolin characterizes background independence/dependence in the con-
text of quantum gravity as follows:
The background dependent approaches are those in which the def-
initions of the states, operators and inner product of the theory require
the specification of the classical metric geometry. The quantum the-
ory then describes quanta moving on this background. The theory
may allow the description of quanta fluctuating around a large class
of backgrounds, but nevertheless, some classical background must be
specified before any physical situation can be described or any cal-
culation can be done. All weak coupling perturbative approaches are
background dependent, as are a number of non-perturbative devel-
opments. [...] The background independent approaches are those in
which no classical metric appears in the definition of the states, opera-
tors and inner product of the theory. [...] [T]he metric and connection
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enter the theory only as operators, and no classical metric appears
in the definition of the state space, dynamics or gauge symmetries.
(Smolin, 1998, pp. 2-3)
In the context of classical general relativistic physics, of course, the metric—
and, therefore, the geometry of space—is dynamical: the metric on spacetime is
not fixed across the physically admissible models of the theory (as it is in, e.g.,
Newtonian and specially relativistic theories). The geometry of spacetime is af-
fected by matter in such a way that different distributions of matter yield different
geometries—the coupling and the dynamics is described by Einstein’s field equa-
tion. In other words, general relativity does not depend on the fixed metrical
structure of spacetime; rather, the metric itself, and hence the geometry, comes
only once a matter distribution has been specified (and the dynamical equation
has been solved). This ‘model-variance’ is another way of making sense of back-
ground independence. Loop gravity is a direct quantization of classical general
relativity, and involves the metric and connection being turned into operators. It
is, therefore, background independent too. Many of the conceptually novel and
problematic aspects of loop gravity stem from its background independence. Be-
low I briefly consider an argument for relationalism based on background inde-
pendence that many physicists have endorsed, and that Rovelli endorses in this
book.
Firstly, note that quantizing the canonical theory, in the loop representation,
led to the application of spin-networks, introduced in the 1970s by Roger Pen-
rose.20 Specifically, in the context of loop quantum gravity it is found that the
spin-networks form a basis for the quantum states—the spin-networks are eigen-
states of certain geometrical operators. Penrose’s original idea was to dispense
with the continuous spacetime manifold, and replace it with a combinatorial struc-
ture:
A reformulation is suggested in which quantities normally requir-
ing continuous coordinates for their description are eliminated from
primary consideration. In particular, space and time have therefore
to be eliminated, and what might be called a form of Mach’s princi-
ple must be invoked: a relationship of an object to some background
20A spin-network is a graph whose nodes represent ‘chunks’ of space and whose links repre-
sent surfaces separating these chunks. The spin-network (or rather the equivalence class of spin-
networks under the group of diffeomorphisms of the spatial manifold) then represents a quantum
state of the gravitational field, or of space.
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space should not be considered—only relationships of objects to each
other can have significance. (Penrose, 1971, p 151)
Following Penrose’s line, the claim of many of those working on loop quan-
tum gravity is that spin-networks point towards a relational conception of space.
Why? The reason is connected to background independence (and, though I leave
this hanging in the air here, the hole argument: see Rickles, 2005). The central
claim is that spin-networks represent quantum space (i.e. a quantized version of
the spatial part of the gravitational field). However, in order to accomplish this, the
states must, amongst other things, be diffeomorphism invariant. Yet spin-networks
are defined on a (compact three-dimensional) manifold, just like the metric was in
the classical case. Formally, hitting a spin-network with a diffeomorphism shifts
it around the manifold. Thus, we need to impose the constraints (i.e. we need to
solve the quantum Einstein equations). This is achieved by taking the equivalence
class of spin-networks under these diffeomorphisms, giving us a diffeomorphism
invariant s-knot (for ‘spin’-knot) or ‘abstract’ spin-network. The idea is that the
s-knot is ‘smeared out’ over the manifold; it is not a localized entity—so hitting
an s-knot with a diffeomorphism does nothing, we simply get the same state back.
However, any other fields must then be localized with respect to these s-knots;
the s-knots represent space and define location. Since the s-knots are dynami-
cal entities—being, roughly, a quantum analogue of the classical metric field—it
seems as though localization has been relativized to these dynamical objects. The
move to relationalism about space strikes many physicists as ineluctable.
Rovelli sketches the supposed implication—on the understanding that (ac-
tive) diffeomorphism invariance implements background independence in general
relativity—as follows:
[Diffeomorphism invariance] implies that spacetime localization
is relational, for the following reason. If (ψ,Xn) is a solution of the
equations of motion, then so is (φ(ψ), φ(Xn)) [where φ is a diffeomor-
phism]. But φ might be the identity for all coordinate times t before
a given t0 and differ from the identity for some t > t0. the value
of a field at a given point in M, or the position of a particle in M,
change under the active diffeomorphism φ. If they were observable,
determinism would be lost, because equal initial data could evolve in
physically distinguishable ways respecting the equations of motion.
Therefore classical determinism forces us to interpret the invariance
under DiffM as a gauge invariance: we must assume that diffeomor-
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phic configurations are physically indistinguishable. (Rovelli, 1999,
p. 3)
Hence, the ‘physical’ aspects of a system are not given by specifying a sin-
gle field configuration, but instead by the “equivalence class of field configura-
tions...related by diffeomorphisms” (ibid). The observables of such a system are
then given by diffeomorphism invariant quantities. Such specifications of states
and observables are clearly independent of any background metric: only gauge-
invariant quantities are to enter into such specification, and any reference to a
background metric (via, for example, fixed coordinates or functions onM) yields
non-gauge-invariant quantities. Thus, diffeomorphisms change the localization of
fields onM; this is represented in the Hamiltonian scenario by the action of the
constraints. However, the localization is a gauge freedom, so any states or observ-
ables involving localization to points will not be physical. A physical spacetime
is, then, given by an equivalence class of manifolds, metrics (and other dynamical
fields) under all the actions of the gauge group Diff(M). Rovelli explicates the
step to relationalism as follows:
[t]he point is that only physically meaningful definition of loca-
tion within GR is relational. GR describes the world as a set of inter-
acting fields including gµν(x), and possibly other objects, and motion
can be defined only by positions and displacements of these dynam-
ical objects relative to each other. [...] All this is coded in the active
diffeomorphism invariance ... of GR. Because active diff invariance
is gauge, the physical content of GR is expressed only by those quan-
tities, derived from the basic dynamical variables, which are fully in-
dependent from the points of the manifold. [.] [Diff invariance] gets
rid of the manifold. (Rovelli, 2001, p. 108)
The ontological conclusion regarding the relationalist conception of space
seems to be drawn from two principle ideas: (1) the fact that localization is re-
lational; and (2) the fact that Leibniz equivalence has been imposed—i.e. by
solving the diffeomorphism constraint in the move to s-knots. These are not in-
dependent in this case: relational localization enforces Leibniz equivalence—i.e.
(1) implies (2)—since the gauge freedom arises precisely by localizing absolutely
with respect to the manifold.
The problem is, however, that relational localization cannot itself deliver re-
lationalism about space(time), since, on the understanding that the 3-metric and
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s-knot state represent classical and quantum space, the localization is relativized
to space! But this then simply begs the question about the ontological nature of
space. In particular, many substantivalists—those of the ‘sophisticated’ stripe—
endorse just such a view in the classical case (i.e. that the metric field should be
identified with substantival spacetime: cf. Hoefer, 1996), and there is no reason
why they shouldn’t carry their views over into the quantum context too so that
s-knots are identified with substantival space. Naturally, since relational localiza-
tion implies Leibniz equivalence, it follows that substantivalists can endorse that
too.21
Chapter 3 focuses on Mechanics, and contains Rovelli’s attempt to formu-
late a version of mechanics that is sufficient for general relativistic physics, yet
is nonetheless capable of encompassing non-general relativistic physics too. His
response is to revise the notions of ‘state’ and ‘observable,’ and his motto is “me-
chanics is about relations between observables” (2004, p.118). In other words,
space and time, conceived of as independent entities, do not enter into this pic-
ture.
In the nonrelativistic context, time is a primary concept. Mechan-
ics is defined as the theory of the evolution in time. In the definition
considered here, on the other hand, no special partial observable is
singled out as the independent variable. (Rovelli, 2004, p. 118)
The following chapter, Chapter 4, gives Hamiltonian general relativity (based
on a connection variable22) the same treatment; and chapter 5 then applies the
same insight to quantum mechanics.
Rovelli claims that a number of thorny problems from general relativity and
quantum gravity can be cleaned up or resolved by utilizing his distinction between
‘partial’ and ‘complete’ observables: a partial observable is a physical quantity
to which we can associate a measurement leading to a number and a complete
21Of course, there are independent arguments pointing to the fact that substantivalists can en-
dorse Leibniz equivalence. What I have sketched here is simply an indirect one.
22Until the 1980s, it was believed that general relativity should be cast as a dynamical theory
of metrics. (This was the general view. However, Einstein and Schro¨dinger considered general
relativity as a dynamical theory governing the Levi-Civita connection. The Palatini formalism too
makes use of a connection. See Baez &Munian, 1994, III.3, for further details.) However, in 1986
Abhay Ashtekar discovered a new set of variables that cast general relativity in the same language
as the gauge field theories that the standard model is based on; a kind of ‘formal unification’ was
thus achieved. This crucial step led to the possibility of constructing quantum loop representations
of general relativity.
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observable is defined as a quantity whose value (or probability distribution) can
be predicted by the relevant theory. Partial observables are taken to coordinatize
an extended configuration space Q and complete observables coordinatize an as-
sociated reduced phase space Γred. The “predictive content” of some dynamical
theory is then given by the kernel of the map f : Q× Γred → Rn. What I wish to
consider here is (1) how this has a bearing on some conceptual issues in loop quan-
tum gravity, and (2) how we can make sense of this idea at all. Let us begin with
(2). I wish to consider his claim that “the extended configuration space has a direct
physical interpretation, as the space of the partial observables” (2002, p. 124013-
1, my emphasis). This space gives the kinematics of a theory and the dynamics is
given by the constraints, φ(qa, pa) = 0, on the associated extended phase space
T ∗Q. Both are invested with physicality by Rovelli; the partial observables, in
particular, are taken to be physical variables. Thus, whereas, for example, Stachel
(1993) argues that the kinematical state space of a background independent theory
like general relativity has no physical meaning prior to a solution (so that only the
dynamical state space is invested with the power to represent genuine physical
possibilities; kinematics then being in this sense derivative), Rovelli appears to
take both kinematic and dynamical spaces as equally robust. The content appears
to be this: there are quantities that can be measured whose values are not predicted
by the theory. Yet the theory is deterministic because it does predict correlations
between partial observables. The dynamics is then spelt out in terms of relations
between partial observables.
The view Rovelli defends has some immediate philosophical interest since it
is non-reductive (i.e. a physical interpretation is given to the phase space with
symmetries) and yet Rovelli is a self-proclaimed relationalist. Thus, prima facie,
we seem to have an instance of a break between possibility counting/geometric
spaces and spacetime ontology.
Rovelli distinguishes between two extremes of interpretation with respect to
the formal variables of a theory for a system with constraints (I have changed the
notation to suit my own):
It is sometimes claimed that the theory can only be interpreted if
one finds a way to “deparameterize” the theory, namely, to select the
independent variable among the variables qa. In the opposite camp,
the statement is sometimes made that only variables on the physical
phase space Γred have a physical interpretation, and no interpretation
should be associated with the variables of the extended configuration
space Γ. (Rovelli, 2002, p. 124013-7)
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By contrast, Rovelli invests elements of Γ and Q (including gauge-dependent
quantities) with physical reality; indeed, elements of the latter are taken to be
“the quantities with the most direct physical interpretation” (ibid.). Complete
observables—i.e. the quantities we actually measure and are able to predict uniquely
(i.e. Bergmann/Dirac observables: cf. Earman (2003))—are dynamically deter-
mined a´ la Stachel (op. cit.):
Such a quantity can be seen as a function on the space of solutions
modulo all gauges. This space is the physical phase space of the
theory Γred. ... Any complete observable can thus be expressed as a
function on Γred. (Rovelli, 2002, p. 124013-3)
Crucially, Rovelli notes that there is an equivalent description of any complete
observable “as a function on the extended phase space having vanishing Poisson
brackets with all first class constraints” (loc. cit.; my emphasis).23 Thus, we
see a formal equivalence between reduced and unreduced spaces at the level of
observables, providing one imposes certain conditions of the unreduced, extended,
space. In this approach, then, Rovelli distinguishes between what is observable
and what there is (i.e. ontology), whereas elsewhere (1997, 2001), in arguing for
his relationalism, he appears to assume a direct connection between the two.
Is this a formal move or an interpretive move? Clearly, loop gravity exists
independently of this framework, and the partial observables programme has not
modified loop gravity in any significant way. What it does do is provide a way
of making conceptual sense of what loop gravity is about. We can perhaps get a
better grip on Rovelli’s idea by comparing it with Bergmann’s work on observ-
ables. In a nutshell, Rovelli’s partial observables programme says that Bergmann
was wrong—or, at least, only half right. Bergmann’s observables are the same
as Rovelli’s complete observables, and they correspond to quantities that can be
predicted by the theory’s laws, just as in Rovelli’s approach. Neither partial ob-
servables, nor any close cousin, appear in Bergmann’s approach, for such things
are gauge-dependent. By choosing gauge-invariant functions, Bergmann hoped
to line up his notion of observables (the gauge-theoretic notion) with the standard
‘operational’ idea of observables, i.e. those that appear in classical and quantum
mechanics. Rovelli says there’s more to the story than that: there are quantities
that can be measured but not predicted, they are ‘partial’ in just this sense. In
23Note that Rovelli’s use of “extended” here bears no relation to the BRST method, where
one literally extends a phase space by adding extra variables. “Extended” here simply means
“unreduced”.
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investing them with physicality Rovelli is making a rather dramatic shift from the
standard way of viewing observables in gauge theories; and, indeed, mechanics
in general. Since Rovelli intends this shift to apply beyond general relativity and
quantum gravity, I think this is an area philosophers should be investigating.
Thus, the concepts of partial and complete observables are rather difficult to
make sense of, since the usual way of thinking about gauge-dependent quantities
is as unphysical entities. They are indeterministic (that is why they are deemed
gauge); the fact that they cannot be determined usually leads one to say that they
are unmeasurable too. Bergmann had no problems casting them out and restricting
the class of observables to the operational kind, the gauge-invariants. I think we
can gain more of an understanding about what is going on here when we look at
how Rovelli wields the distinction in the context of specific interpretive problems.
A pre-GR theory is formulated in terms of variables (such as q)
evolving as functions of certain distinguished variables (such as t).
General relativistic systems are formulated in terms of variables ...
that evolve with respect to each other. General relativity expresses
relations between these, but in general we cannot solve for one as a
function of the other. Partial observables are genuinely on the same
footing. (Rovelli, 2002, p. 124013-3)
The theory describes relative evolution of (gauge-dependent) variables as func-
tions of each other. No variable is privileged as the independent one (cf. Mon-
tesinos et al., 1992, p. 5). How does this resolve the problem of time? The idea is
that coordinate time evolution and physical evolution are entirely different beasts.
To get physical evolution, all one needs is a pair 〈C,C〉 consisting of an extended
configuration space (coordinated by partial observables) and a function on T∗C
giving the dynamics. The dynamics concerns the relations between elements of C,
and though the individual elements do not have a well defined evolution, relations
between them (i.e. correlations) do: they are independent of coordinate time.
The natural interpretation of Rovelli’s view is that there is no physical dis-
tinction between gauge dependent and independent quantities. This implies that
there are physically real quantities that are not predictable, even though we can
associate a measurement procedure with them; indeed, Rovelli claims that these
variables “are the quantities with the most direct physical interpretation in the the-
ory” (ibid., p. 124013-7). I find this extremely puzzling, since it cuts squarely
across the usual understanding of gauge-dependent quantities. For this reason
Rovelli’s proposal merits serious attention from philosophers.
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Before I leave this topic I should just mention one more interesting suggestion
that Rovelli makes with regard to the ‘flow of time’. Now, it is a consequence
of the partial observables approach that time is not in any way special: the time
variable as measured by a clock is, ontologically, on a par with any other partial
observable. Yet there is something of a paradox here, for it is evident that there
is something rather special about time, it seems that t is singled out: it seems to
‘flow,’ it seems to have ‘direction,’ and so on. Rovelli claims that it is statistical
mechanics that does the singling out—he calls this ‘the thermal time hypothesis”.
I do not discuss this any further, but it is clear that this idea is full of significance,
for both philosophy of physics and time.
Part two introduces the reader to the details of loop quantum gravity, begin-
ning with a chapter on “Quantum space”. This is, perhaps, the most satisfying of
the book: one gets (in just over 40 pages!) a guide to the mathematics and physics
of quantum space, along with the usual proliferation of conceptual insight. As I
mentioned above, the central representational device is the spin-network. Spin-
networks are a stepping stone to the quantum states of the gravitational field; they
are eigenstates of geometrical operators, such as area and volume, with a physical
interpretation given by measurements of the geometry of some 3-dimensional sur-
face. Mathematically, a spin-network S is an embedded graph 〈Γ, jl, in〉, where
the jl label the spins of the ‘links’ of the graph and the in label the ‘intertwiners’
of the nodes where the links meet. The idea is that the number of nodes and links
in a region or surface respectively determines the volume or area: the more nodes
and links there are, the more volume and area there is. There are operators for the
quantum versions of area and volume. Thus, for the area of surface one has the
operator:
Al = 8pic
−3~G
√
jl(jl + 1) (2)
The eigenvalues of this operator have been explicitly computed and found to
be discrete—likewise for the volume operator. The physical interpretation of a
spin-network is, as I intimated at above, much along the lines of the classical met-
ric on a hypersurface. The difference is, it is quantized in this case. However,
if this is the case, then we clearly face the full force of the hole argument (see
Rickles, 2005). To overcome this, one adopts a resolution much like the com-
mon ‘superspace’ resolution in the classical case. The trick is to take the physical
quantum gravitational field to correspond not to a spin-network, but to a diffeo-
morphism equivalence class of spin-networks, or an s-knot. As Rovelli points out,
“going from the spin-network state | S〉 to the s-knot state | s〉 we preserve the en-
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tire information in | S〉 except for its localization on the 3d space manifold” (2004,
p. 263). Thus, whereas the spin-network state represents a discrete quantized spa-
tial metric, the s-knot state represents a discrete quantum spatial geometry. The
chunks of this geometry, says Rovelli, “do not live on the 3d manifold: they are
only localized with respect to one another...They are not quantum excitations in
space: they are quantum excitations of space itself” (ibid., pp. 263-4). Rovelli
views this as a lesson of background independence.
Rovelli claims that the discreteness result “is a direct consequence of a straight-
forward quantization of GR. Space geometry is quantized in the same manner in
which the energy of an harmonic oscillator is quantized” (ibid., p. 250). The result
is strictly only a consequence given that the surfaces or regions of space are fixed
by dynamical fields that are correlated with the region—indeed, the surfaces and
regions are ‘born’ in such correlations. Any measurement to determine the area
of volume of a bit of space will yield a result within the discrete spectrum of the
relevant (partial) observable.
Now this immediately raises a worry, and this takes us back to the issues raised
previously: since surfaces and regions are understood as coordinate dependent
quantities living on the manifold, they are not gauge-invariant, and so are not
going to be observables. In other words, the measurements of the geometry of a
surface will not be complete observables. A common way of allaying this worry
is to gauge-fix these quantities by having them be surfaces, say, of a material field.
But Rovelli has a different response based on his distinction between partial and
complete observables. He gives the following example to make his point:
Consider a particle moving on a circle, subject to a force. Let φ
be the angular coordinate giving the position of the particle, and pφ its
conjugate momentum. As we know well, pφ turns out to be quantized.
Now, if we write the covariant formulation of this system, we have the
Wheeler-DeWitt equation
Hψ(t, φ) =
(
i~
∂
∂t
− ~2 ∂
2
∂φ2
+ V (φ)
)
ψ(t, φ) = 0, (3)
which, in the language of constrained systems theory, is the hamil-
tonian constraint equation. Notice that the momentum pφ is not a
gauge-invariant quantity: it does not commute with the operator H ,
that is [pφ, H] 6= 0. This happens for precisely the same reason for
which area and volume are not gauge-invariant quantities in GR. But
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this does not affect the simple fact that we can measure pφ and we do
predict that it is quantized. (Rovelli, 2004, p. 265)
Rovelli’s answer to the problem of non-gauge-invariance of area and volume
matches his response in the case of pφ: these quantities are partial observables.
Now, I agree that we can say that these quantities are quantized, despite the fact
that they are non-gauge-invariant: non-physical things can be quantized. But what
does he mean when he says that “we can measure” partial observables? It sim-
ply is not the case that non-gauge-invariant quantities can be measured, for since
they are gauge-dependent they are indeterministic: we won’t know which partial
observable we have measured out of a gauge-equivalence class. So surely partial
observables cannot be measured.
It seems that there is something distinctly modal going on here, and I take the
response to amount to the following: if we were to make a ‘real’ measurement of,
say, the area of some surface, then we would get a result lying in the spectrum of
the (non-gauge-invariant) area operator for that surface. In other words, making
a measurement brings the area of the surface into the realm of complete observ-
ables, so that the quantity is then gauge-invariant. But how are we to make sense
of the ‘pre-measured’ quantity? Does it exist in some ‘potential’ sense which the
measurement then actualizes? Rovelli is not forthcoming on the matter. How-
ever, I have argued elsewhere (see Rickles, forthcoming) that the most sensible
way to understand this situation is in structural terms: the area of a surface is
given by correlations with a measuring device, or simply some dynamical field.
This is somewhat similar to Stachel’s (1993) notion of a dynamical individuation
field, according to which the points of spacetime in general relativity are given
only once a solution is given—i.e. once a matter distribution has been specified.
However, much remains to be said on the matter.
The next three chapters are devoted to ‘extensions’ and ‘applications’. Chap-
ter 7 deals with dynamics and matter, where matter is “anything that is not the
gravitational field” (2004, p. 276). According to Rovelli, pure vacuum quantum
gravity and quantum gravity coupled to material fields (i.e. fields other than the
quantum gravitational field) are conceptually no different, “the second has just
some additional degrees of freedom” (ibid., p. 286). Formally, of course, they are
strikingly similar: the phase spaces are identical, both belonging to the class of
phase spaces that characterizes Yang-Mills theory. However, the ease with which
Rovelli makes this declaration masks a hidden commitment to his brand of rela-
tionalism. Without this, there are obvious conceptual differences: the former is
concerned with empty spaces and the latter with non-empty spaces.
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Like Kiefer, Rovelli discusses as applications of the theory (early regime)
quantum cosmology and black hole thermodynamics. In addition, Rovelli briefly
discusses a possible observable effect of loop gravity. In each case, the relevant
results are derived from the discrete geometrical operators associated with the
spin-network basis.
The most speculative, underdeveloped research crops up in the covariant ex-
tension of loop gravity. The natural extension gives a sum-over-paths twist on
loop gravity leading to a notion of a “Quantum Spacetime,” known as “Spinfoam.”
The full theory is then a sum-over-spinfoams. The boundary of a spin-foam is a
spin-network. Rovelli traces a historical path through a multitude of different
“models,” leading from 3d to 4d spinfoams. Again, Rovelli is keen to expose the
physical meaning of many of these concepts. However, I would liked to have a
discussion explaining how the conceptual problems of the canonical theory fare
in this context. However, the relationship is, as Rovelli points out (p. 363), still a
matter for investigation. It is clear, though, that spinfoams promise to play a cen-
tral role in the full and final theory of quantum gravity underwritten by the loop
representation.
The conclusion wraps the book up with a quick summary of the physical pic-
ture that emerges from loop quantum gravity followed by a tour of the achieve-
ments and remaining tasks of this approach. There can be a ‘peaceful coexis-
tence’ between general relativity and quantum mechanics, but it requires some
substantive changes in our conceptual scheme: this is, in other words, revision-
ary physics. It is also revisionary metaphysics, since what is being proposed is
a conceptual novel world in which spacetime is missing (i.e. in which dynamics
concerns relations between partial observables, rather than evolution with respect
to time). Whether we go along with Rovelli’s relationalism or not, it is clear that
there are many novel conceptual issues to be considered in loop quantum gravity;
this review has barely skimmed the surface.
3 Conclusion
Rovelli’s book, then, evens the balance between string theory and loop grav-
ity, while Kiefer’s exposes some of the details and assumptions of both sides of
the ‘strings/loops’ divide. I think that Kiefer’s book is a good place for inter-
ested mathematically adept philosophers to begin before considering the partic-
ular approaches in more detail. The value of Kiefer’s book lies in it’s relatively
impartial approach with respect to loops and strings; both theories have their prob-
lems well articulated. I suggest that Kiefer’s and Rovelli’s books, coupled with
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Zweibach’s (2004) book on string theory, would provide sufficient weaponry to
enable philosophers of physics to boldly enter the somewhat hair raising territory
of quantum gravity. In sum then, this pair of books complement each other rather
nicely as far as the philosophical investigation of quantum gravity goes; they will
be certain to ease the philosopher’s transition to quantum gravity. Both keep an
eye on conceptual issues, and explicitly engage with interpretational aspects. Rov-
elli’s book, in particular, comes across as an ‘olive branch’ to philosophers (and
can, perhaps, be viewed as an implementation of Kuhn’s depiction of revolution-
ary science). Though Kiefer’s book too deals with conceptual issues, it’s useful-
ness will ultimately rest in its scope: It provides a picture of quantum gravity in
broad brushstrokes. However, I think that Rovelli has amply demonstrated that it
is from the loop gravity approach that philosophers will reap most benefits. I sim-
ply cannot emphasize enough how good a job Rovelli has done in making explicit
the physical commitments of the theory.
In sum, Rovelli has written a work that will make serious philosophical work
on quantum gravity possible.24 The formalism is made utterly transparent, and
available to any philosopher with a decent grasp of quantum theory and a little
differential geometry (i.e. to most philosophers of physics). The conceptual is-
sues are exposed in many places, or at least plenty of earth is removed from atop
them, making entry into the field particularly easy. I thank Rovelli for this and rec-
ommend that all philosophers of physics with an interest in space and time invest
in his book. While I can recommend Kiefer’s book to philosophers, I feel I have
to issue a ‘health warning’ alongside it since it is very heavy going on account of
the assumptions it makes: This book is only for those with strong backgrounds in
mathematical physics.
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